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This article has five parts.  The first provides an overview of major structural 
weaknesses in the Pakistani economy—I call them faultlines.  The following three 
parts describe the programme of stabilisation and structural reform introduced by the 
caretaker administration of Prime Minister Meraj Khalid.  This government was in 
office for 104 days, from November 5, 1996 to February 17, 1997.  On February 17, 
the government headed by Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif took office.  The fifth 
part provides a brief assessment of what lies in Pakistan’s future if the problems 
created by delayed structural reforms are not addressed adequately and on time. 
 
A.  A DOZEN FAULTLINES 
The faults and fissures that exist below the structure of the Pakistani society 
and economy did not materialise suddenly.  Some of them may have appeared 
recently but several of them have been around for a long time.  I emphasise this point 
not to shift the responsibility from one administration to another, or from one 
political party to another, or even from one political system to another.  An important 
fact about the way Pakistan’s economy has been managed is that ever since its birth, 
there has been a tendency on the part of the decision-makers to concentrate on 
solving immediate problems rather than reflect on and deal with structural issues.  
The reason for this approach, adopted by our decision-makers time and time again, is 
perhaps a simple one: Pakistan has faced more crises—political, social, and 
economic—than was the case for the countries that have attained long-term 
sustainable growth. 
 
My list of faultlines reads as follows: 
•  A severe fiscal imbalance—or budget deficit—which continues to persist 
despite the efforts made by several governments to contain it. 
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•  A monetary system that does not operate independently of the political 
system.  On the contrary, it has provided resources to indulge the often 
extravagant behaviour on the part of those who were in power. 
•  A poorly developed financial system and a banking sector which remained 
under considerable strain ever since the nationalisation of financial 
institutions in the early 1970s. 
•  Low rates of domestic savings,  a problem that has persisted since the birth of 
Pakistan and created a habit of dependence on external savings—capital 
flows. 
•  A high and growing burden of external and internal debt, the result of careless 
borrowing from external and internal creditors. 
•  Low rates of investment and equally low rates of return on them, occasioned 
by disregard for committing resources to only those projects that had a high 
social pay-off. 
•  Rapidly deteriorating physical infrastructure. 
•  Poorly developed human capital. 
•  Rapid population growth. 
•  The inability of the government to provide basic services to the poorer 
segments of the population. 
•  Re-emergence of poverty. 
•  A legal system in which the people do not have a great deal of confidence. 
 
(i)  Fiscal Imbalance 
By far, the most important problem Pakistan faces today is a serious fiscal 
imbalance.  Fiscal imbalances have been around for a while but the point has been 
reached where they cannot be sustained at their present level for much longer.  The 
debate over the budget presented by the government of Ms Benazir Bhutto in June 
1996 and the one put forward by the administration of Mian Nawaz Sharif in June 
1997 has highlighted one significant fact about the fiscal situation in Pakistan: there 
is almost a total absence of political consensus on how the government should 
balance its books. 
No government, whether it belongs to the left or the right of the political 
spectrum, can afford to ignore the simple arithmetic that must support and underpin 
all budgetary calculations. This arithmetic has a bottom line: the governments must 
not spend much more than they earn.  If they do—as they have done for years in 
Pakistan—the economy is left with a debt burden that is hard to shoulder and, even 
worse, tends to increase over time. Pakistan: Growth Set Back  317 
There are basically two ways of handling budget deficits.  One, to borrow 
from the markets the funds the government needs to balance its books.  Two, to 
balance the books by printing money.  Both approaches have negative consequences 
for the markets.  The first is called “crowding out”, since government borrowing will 
be at the expense of the credit needed by the private sector.  If the government 
borrows large amounts, interest rates will increase and become unbearable for the 
private sector.  In other words, private entrepreneurs will be crowded out of the credit 
markets.  Since the overall rate of return on government expenditure is almost always 
lower than that realised by the private sector, large amounts of borrowing by the 
government has the effect of lowering the rate of economic growth. Government 
borrowing also creates a debt burden which eats into future earnings. At times 
governments in Pakistan have paid very generously to their creditors.  That was the 
case with the “khas deposits,” introduced in the early 1980s, which have contributed 
massively to the burden of debt the government now carries.  This is a subject to 
which I will return in a moment. 
 
(ii)  Lax Monetary Management 
The second way of financing budget deficits is even more costly in terms of 
the impact on the economy in general and on the poor in particular.  The 
governments are often tempted to print money to pay for budgetary shortfalls.  This 
is especially the case when the central banks that have the authority to create money 
are beholden to the governments.  This is also the reason why so many programmes 
of economic reforms aim to provide autonomy to the central government. The 
caretaker administration of Moeen Qureshi included the granting of autonomy to the 
State Bank in its programme of structural reform.  Not unexpectedly, this move did 
not win favour with the political government that succeeded the one headed by 
Qureshi.  Ms Bhutto, once again, brought the State Bank under the control of the 
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry, in keeping with past practices, turned to the 
Bank to finance a significant proportion of the budgetary deficit by expanding the 
money supply.  
Printing money has its costs: the most obvious one is inflation, the result of 
too much money chasing a limited supply of goods and services.  The economists 
call the resort to printing more money “inflation tax.”  It is well known that the 
burden of “inflation tax” falls on the less well-to-do.  Since economies are expected 
to grow and since developing countries are constantly monetising some parts of the 
economy, it is legitimate for the central bank to print more money than is required to 
replace the existing stock.  But it is important to stay within reasonable limits.  If 
these limits are crossed, the result would be inflation.  The fact that Pakistan is 
currently experiencing the levels of price increases that are not in line with its 
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bank to expand the monetary base.  The way we have managed monetary policy has 
created the second of my twelve faultlines in our economy. 
What can, or should, the government do to close this fiscal gap?  There are 
basically two options, but they are not mutually exclusive: to raise government 
revenues and lower expenditures.   Both options are politically difficult.   As the 
budget of 1996-97 clearly demonstrated, sharp increases in tax burden are difficult to 
sell to the people especially when the people perceive that they are being asked to 
shoulder a burden well beyond their capacity to carry.  If the imposition of additional 
tax burden comes with the perception that many influential groups are being let off 
the tax hook, the result is voter anger.  The Nawaz Sharif government, in developing 
its budgetary proposals, put faith in two changes.  First, reviving the economy and 
hoping that with an increase in the rate of growth of gross domestic product, 
government revenues would also increase.  Second, a fairly significant cut in current 
as well as capital expenditures by the public sector. 
 
(iii)  A Dysfunctional Financial System 
The structure of the financial sector has produced the third faultline.  In the 
late Fifties and most of the Sixties, Pakistan had begun to lay the basis for the 
creation of a robust financial system.  Private commercial banking system was 
developing rapidly; investment banks set up in the public sector were performing 
reasonably well; National Investment Trust and the Investment Corporation of 
Pakistan had created viable vehicles for mobilising household savings and directing 
them into industry, finance, and commerce; Karachi Stock Exchange had developed 
into one of the more vibrant capital markets in the developing world.  These 
impressive developments were unfortunately interrupted by the massive 
nationalisation undertaken by the government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1972-74.   
Bhutto’s nationalisation had three extremely adverse consequences.  First,  it 
brought to a sudden halt the development of private commercial banking.  Pakistan 
lost precious banking skills developed during the Ayub Khan period.  A number of 
bankers who had learned their skills on the job migrated to the Middle East, Europe, 
and North America.  Second, it politicised the banking sector.  With the government 
now controlling all banks, the stage was set for their misuse by politicians.  The fact 
that public sector banks do not perform well and contribute to the corruption of the 
political system is a lesson that was to be learned time and time again by several 
developing countries, particularly those in Latin America.  If we are to be guided by 
some of the recent crises in Latin America, we can be certain that the cost of 
restoring health to the banking sector in Pakistan will be very large, possibly of the 
order of 10 to 15 percent of the gross domestic product.  It would be extremely 
difficult to find this amount of resource in an already tight budgetary situation.   
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crept into the banking sector.  To take one simple example by way of illustrating this 
point, the public sector banks were not able to adequately serve the expatriate 
community.  Large amounts of remittances sent by the Pakistanis working in the 
Middle East flowed through the hundi system rather than via the banks.  If the banks 
had remained in the private sector, there is no doubt that they would have found 
ways to serve the Pakistani Diaspora and, at the same time, they would have 
expanded their presence outside Pakistan. 
 
(iv)  Low Rates of Domestic Savings 
A very poor state of government finance coupled with a poorly performing 
financial sector have kept domestic savings at a very low level.  Pakistanis save much 
less than Indians; they save considerably less than the citizens of the “tiger” 
economies of Southeast Asia.  In 1995, the last year  for which comparative data are 
available, domestic savings rate in Pakistan was estimated at 16 percent of the gross 
domestic product as compared with 22 percent in India, 36 percent for Thailand and 
36 percent for Korea.  A low savings rate translates into a low rate of investment; it 
also adds to the burden of debt, if the country has a large resource balance.  In 
Pakistan the resource balance—the difference between the rate of investment and 
savings—was estimated at 3 percent in 1994.  I should point out though that this 
level of resource balance is considerably less than the double-digit imbalances 
registered earlier; in 1980, for instance, the gap between investment and savings was 
equivalent to 12 percent of the gross domestic product.  However, Pakistan no longer 
has external savings available for financing such a large resource gap. Worker 
remittances have declined; official development assistance has also become scarce; 
and Pakistan is not favoured as a destination by private capital. 
 
(v)  Growing Debt Burden 
The resource balance discussed above is not the only gap that economic 
decision-makers in Pakistan must worry about.  They have also to take cognisance of 
the growing difference between external earnings and expenditures. In 1995-96, 
Pakistan had a current account deficit of well over $4 billion, a record amount, 
considerably larger than the previous high of $3.37 billion registered in 1992-93.  
The current account deficit has more than quadrupled in the last ten years—the 
average for the first half of the 1980s was only $945 million.  While the current 
account deficit reached a record level in 1995-96, it was less than the peak when 
measured in terms of its proportion of the gross domestic product.  In 1983-84, 
Pakistan’s current account deficit was equivalent to 5.4 percent of GDP compared to 
an estimated 4.4 percent in 1995-96.  But, as we shall see presently, not much 
comfort can be drawn from this fact since Pakistan no longer possesses the means to 
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At the same time, the more liberal trade policy adopted by the governments 
since 1990 has resulted in a significant increase in imports.  The value of imports 
increased to over $10 billion in 1992-93, nearly 12 percent higher than in the 
previous year.  However, imports declined to only $8.7 billion in 1993-94 but 
jumped back to $10.1 billion in 1994-95.  They are estimated to be over $11 billion 
in the year that ended on June 30, 1995.  Contrary to the general impression, the 
value of exports has kept pace with the increase in imports.  The result is that the 
trade balance—the difference between the value of  imports and exports—has 
remained unchanged for several years at about $2.5 billion a year.  But the problem 
is that a negative balance of this magnitude year after year can only be sustained if 
the country has resources to pay for it.  This it did for about a decade and half, from 
1975 to 1990, when sharp increases in the flow of workers’ remittances and in the 
availability of concessionary assistance from a number of donors paid trade 
imbalance.  Now with these two sources of funds providing fewer dollars, Pakistan 
has been paying for a persistent trade imbalance by borrowing on commercial and 
near-commercial terms. As indicated above, the most important of these factors is the 
sharp decline in workers’ remittances.  In the first half of the Eighties, Pakistan 
received on average $2.48 billion from its citizens working abroad.  In the first half 
of the Nineties, however, the level of remittances declined to only $1.65 billion. 
Pakistan has relied very heavily on borrowing in order to cover the two 
gaps—between domestic savings and investment, and between external earnings and 
expenditure—that have persisted almost since the country’s birth.  The consequence 
of this has been a sharp build up in both external and internal debt.  The Government 
of Pakistan estimated outstanding external debt at $31.92 billion on June 30, 1995.  
According to the World Bank, the net present value of external debt had reached the 
level of 42 percent of GDP in 1994.  However, it is not the stock of debt that is a 
problem but the terms on which it has been obtained.  The end of the Cold War has 
reduced the incentive to provide economic assistance, particularly to those countries 
such as Pakistan that were deeply engaged in the conflict between the west and the 
Soviet Union.  In the case of Pakistan, official development assistance has declined 
precipitously, from 5.1 percent of GDP in 1980 to barely 3.1 percent in 1994.  With 
the sources of concessional funds drying up, Pakistan has relied on borrowings on 
near-commercial terms (from the IMF, the World Bank and the Asian Development 
Bank) and on commercial terms from international capital markets.  During difficult 
periods—when there was either a sharp decline in international reserves or some 
large payments were due to external creditors—it has borrowed heavily short-term 
money from commercial banks at high rates of interest.  Consequently, in the last few 
years, the term profile of external debt has deteriorated. The result of all this is a 
growing burden of debt servicing. The government estimates that in the last five 
years the share of debt service in export earnings has been increasing steadily.  Debt 
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The burden of internal debt has grown even faster than that of external debt.  
For the last two decades, governments of various political persuasions have shown 
one common propensity: to turn to their own citizens for financing their deficits.  
Politicians did not care to explain to the people that to pay for government services 
by borrowing rather than by taxing means shifting the burden from the present to the 
future generations.  A certain amount of inter-generational transfers make sense in 
rapidly growing economies.  The assumption is that the present generation is too 
poor to be able to pay for investments that will bear fruit in the future.  For such 
investments—resources committed to education, health, physical infrastructure—it is 
appropriate to borrow and delay the payment to the time when benefits begin to flow.  
This argument is difficult to apply to the case of Pakistan since much of the 
government’s deficit results from current expenditures. 
The government estimates that by 1994-95 outstanding internal debt was 
equivalent to 42 percent of the gross domestic product, twice as much as in 1980-81.  
This burden has increased steadily in the last fifteen years.  In 1994-95 interest 
payment on internal debt amounted to Rs 103 billion or 22 percent of total 
government expenditure. 
 
(vi)  A Low Level of Investment 
We have already seen that Pakistan is investing a relatively smaller share of its 
gross domestic product as compared to other poor countries.  The countries that have 
grown rapidly did so by saving and investing more than a third of their current 
income—most of the “tiger economies” of Southeast Asia invested nearly two-fifths 
of their GDP while Pakistan has managed to invest no more than one-fifth of its gross 
domestic product.  What is even more troubling in the case of Pakistan is the trend in 
the rate of growth in investment.  From 1980 to 1990 gross domestic investment 
increased at the rate of 5.9 percent a year.  Since then the rate of increase has 
declined to 4.7 percent.  Not only does Pakistan invest a smaller proportion of its 
gross domestic product, what it invests is less productive than in the rapidly growing 
economies of Southeast Asia.  Reliable estimates of productivity trends in Pakistan 
are not available, but considering the state of physical infrastructure and human 
capital, it would be correct to suggest that the level of productivity has not increased. 
 
(vii)  Poorly Developed Physical Capital 
Included in my list of “faultlines” are two important characteristics of 
Pakistan’s current economic and social situation: poorly developed physical and 
human capital.  We do not need a great deal of data and information to highlight the 
constraint that the lack of appropriate physical capital is now imposing on economic 
growth.  Roads in all major cities are clogged with traffic.  A recent study estimated 
“crawl rates”—the rate at which the traffic moves—for various cities in Asia.  Both Shahid Javed Burki  322 
Karachi and Lahore were among the worst performers. Inter-city highways in 
Pakistan are grossly inadequate for the traffic they carry.  In the last twenty-five 
years there was a remarkable ten-fold increase in the number of vehicles plying on 
the roads of Pakistan, from 364,000 in 1970 to 3.75 million in 1995. At the same 
time, total road length increased less than three-fold, from 73,000 km in 1970 to 
205,000 in 1994-95. There are now 18 vehicles per kilometer of paved road in the 
country, compared to only 5 in the early Seventies.  It is not surprising, therefore, 
that  Pakistan has one of the highest rates of deaths in the world caused by road 
accidents.  However, the highway sector is not the only one to have been given a low 
priority.  Pakistan has also seriously neglected the development of railways, 
particularly for long-haul freight traffic.  It has added less than two hundred 
kilometres to the length of railways in the last thirty years.  In the mid-Fifties, the 
railways carried 11 million tons of freight.  The amount carried peaked in 1974-75 
when the system hauled 15 million tons.  In 1994-95, the amount of freight carried 
declined to only 8.11 million tons. 
 
(viii)  Poorly Developed Human Capital 
Paralleling the neglect of physical infrastructure is the lack of attention given 
to the development of human capital. By now the story has been told a number of 
times and is fairly well known.  For a country at its level of development—
particularly when income is measured in terms of “purchasing power parity”—
Pakistan should have a much higher level of social development.  It should have an 
infant mortality rate of no more than 30 per one thousand births; instead it loses close 
to one hundred out of every 1000 children born before they reach the age of one.  It 
has one of the highest rates of maternal mortality in the world.  Some 600 women die 
during child-birth for 100,000 live births compared to 200 in the Philippines and 
Turkey.  Pakistan has done even less well in terms of education.  It is inexcusable 
that two-thirds of its adult population is still classified as illiterate as compared with 
much lower proportions in other large countries of Asia.  In 1994, 49 percent of the 
adult Indian population was deemed to be illiterate, while China had reduced the 
level of illiteracy to below nineteen percent of the adult population. 
It is also well known that Pakistan does not treat its women with the same 
amount of care it shows to its male population.  In every area of social 
development—health, education, participation in labour markets, equality before the 
law—women are way behind men.  A number of statistics—rates of infant, child and 
maternal mortality, the extent of malnutrition among children, incidence of disease, 
enrolment in primary and secondary education, participation in the labour force—
clearly demonstrate the backwardness of women.  Even with exceptionally serious 
efforts directed at improving women’s welfare, it will take a long time before the 
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bad not only on humane grounds.  It is now well-known that by keeping its women 
backwards a society condemns itself to eternal backwardness.  Pakistan cannot be an 
exception to this rule. 
 
(ix)  An Exploding Population 
Next on my list of faultlines is the increasing burden of population.  A high 
rate of population, which continues to persist despite a significant increase in per 
capita incomes over the last three decades, is the consequence of two things.   
Whereas some improvement in infant, child, and maternal mortality rates has 
increased the life expectancy at birth—from 54 years in 1965 to 63 years in 1995—
total fertility rates remain very high.  This translates into a high rate of population 
growth.  When Pakistan celebrated its fiftieth anniversary on August 14, 1997, its 
population was about 136 million, four-and-a-quarter times larger than the size of the 
population at the time of its birth.  In the last fifty years, Pakistan has added 104 
million people to the population of 32 million it inherited on August 14, 1947.   
“When Allah causes a human being to be born, it also gives him two feet to walk, 
two hands to work with,” is a common Pakistani saying.  But Allah also asks its 
creation to use their thinking faculties.  Pakistan’s current population is close to 
reaching the country’s carrying capacity.  But even if a miracle occurred to reduce 
the fertility rate, demographic inertia will carry forward Pakistan’s population for 
many more decades.  My guess is that we will double our population within 32 years; 
by the year 2030, we will have 265 million people living in the country.  When we 
celebrate our first centennial in 2047, Pakistan’s population will have reached 350 
million:  twelve times the size of the population with which the country was born. 
One important way in which the population explosion will manifest itself is by 
the creation of a number of mega-cities.  Karachi already has more than 10 million 
people; another 6 to 7 million live in Greater Lahore.  In the next decade, Faisalabad, 
Rawalpindi, Multan, and Hyderabad will cross the 5 million mark.  Some people say 
that Karachi is already ungovernable and that Lahore is reaching that point.  Four to 
six cities may join the difficult-to-govern classification by the early part of the next 
century. 
 
(x)  A Dysfunctional State 
In part because of the enormous expansion of the country’s population, in part 
because of the concentration of a significant proportion of the population in a few 
cities, and in part also because of the scarcity of resources available to the state, the 
government is finding it increasingly difficult to deliver basic services to the poorer 
segments of the population.  The Pakistani state is becoming increasingly 
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one of the faultlines I would like to highlight.  It generates not only disillusionment 
but also breeds mafias that take it upon themselves in various different ways to 
service the people, but at a higher cost.  There are cities all over the developing 
world in which mafias deliver water, haul away solid waste, provide law and order, 
operate lines of credit, deliver food and medicine.  In some slums of urban Brazil, 
mafias also operate schools.  They provide these functions not because they want to 
do good, but because they obtain a high rate of return from their investment in these 
services.  A dysfunctional state that allows its functions to be assumed by criminal 
groups is courting disaster. 
The Pakistani state is rapidly becoming dysfunctional in the sense that it no 
longer has the resources, institutional capacity, the political will, and the confidence 
of the people to deliver basic services to the people.  The state’s failure is particularly 
palpable in the country’s major cities.  In the cities, as the sate withdraws, mafias 
advance.  In many cities the advance of the mafias is being kept in check, not by the 
state, but by the private sector.  In urban Pakistan, security services provided by the 
private sector now stand as the only protection between the increasing power of the 
mafias and the citizens. 
 
(xi)  The Return of Poverty 
When we combine a number of the faultlines I have already mentioned—the 
high rate of population growth, low levels of social development, inability of the 
government to provide basic services, low rates of investment and, therefore, a low 
rate of growth, a sharp decline in foreign remittances flowing to the poor—it should 
not come as a surprise when I say that poverty is returning to Pakistan.  For a while, 
largely because of the very large flow of remittances to the country, Pakistan was 
able to reduce very significantly the incidence of poverty.  My guess is that in the 
mid-1980s the number of people living in absolute poverty had declined to no more 
than one-fifth of the total population.  If this impression is correct, then Pakistan had 
about 20 million absolutely poor people in 1985.  I would not be surprised if we end 
this decade by witnessing a sharp increase in the proportion of absolute poor.  In the 
year 2000, our population will be above 150 million and if one third of this is 
absolutely poor, the poor will number 50 million by the year 2000.  This arithmetic 
suggests that we have added another 30 million people to the stock of poverty in a 
period of a decade and a half.  The gains made in the decade and a half between 1975 
and 1990 and are now being rapidly dissipated. 
 
(xii)  A Dysfunctional Legal System 
My final faultline is related to the problem created by an antiquated legal 
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legal system can become—in the case of Pakistan it has already become—a serious 
obstacle for economic growth.  A fully functional legal system must be able to 
enforce contracts.  It must also provide people proper resources to settle their claims 
on the government as well as on all economic agents.  When legal systems remain 
backward they will inhibit the arrival of foreign capital and entrepreneurship. 
What I have provided above is a list of the dozen faultlines on which Pakistan 
has erected its economic structure.  The weaknesses they cause in the economic 
structure built over time need to be overcome or else we face a very uncertain 
economic future.  I will now turn to the subject of what was done by the caretaker 
administration that took office on November 5, 1996 under the leadership of Prime 
Minister Meraj Khalid.  I was called from Washington to take charge of economic 
policy-making for this administration. 
 
B.  THE CARETAKER’S ECONOMIC PHILOSOPHY 
As the head of the caretaker’s economic team, I chose to focus not only on the 
immediate but also on the long-term; to bring about not only economic stabilisation 
but to introduce long-term structural changes as well.  This two-track approach was 
reminiscent of the one adopted by the government of Moeen Qureshi in the summer 
of 1993. The adoption of this approach raised the same questions that had been asked 
three years earlier: Did the caretakers have the mandate to undertake deep structural 
reforms?  Was not their mandate confined to steadying the economy, conducting the 
elections, and transferring power to whichever person and political parties had the 
largest support in the national assembly? 
This restricted role on the part of a caretaker administration may have been 
implied by the provisions introduced by the eighth amendment in the Constitution of 
1973.  That notwithstanding, in 1993, as well as in 1996, Pakistan faced very serious 
economic crises.  The caretaker administrations that took office in July 1993 and 
again in November 1996 had to deal with serious economic problems, urgently and 
with dispatch.  Having said that, it is useful to emphasise that the nature of the 
economic crisis Pakistan faced in November 1996 was palpably different from the 
one it confronted in 1993.  In 1993, Pakistan had to deal with a serious liquidity 
problem, particularly on the external front.  There was a sharp deterioration in the 
level of reserves and Pakistan faced the possibility of default on external payment 
obligations if urgent remedial actions were not taken.  In 1996, the country had also 
run out of reserves and, once again, was faced with the possibility of defaulting on 
international obligations.  What made the 1996 crisis organically different from the 
one faced three years earlier was that it came with a systemic collapse.  The style of 
governance practised by the administration that was dismissed on November 5 had 
caused institutional decay on a scale unprecedented in the country’s history.  Public 
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and public corporations were all massively bankrupt and threatened with extinction.  
Provincial governments and the federal government were spending money as if they 
had access to an unlimited supply of financial resources.  On November 5, 1996, 
Pakistan’s economy did not just need a blood transfusion; it required open heart 
surgery and an organ transplant. 
Before I go on to describe the programme of stabilisation and structural 
change introduced by the caretaker administration, I should answer one other 
question that was asked repeatedly in the first few days and weeks after November 5.  
There were many serious people—some of them within the ranks of the caretaker 
administration itself—who took the position that a 90-day period was not long 
enough to tackle the problems that had led to the dismissal of the government of 
Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto.  Ehtasab before Intekhab (Accountability before 
Election) became the slogan of those who believed that Pakistan needed a thorough 
cleansing of the political and economic system.  A period of 90 days was clearly not 
long enough to accomplish this herculean task.  However, the President, the Prime 
Minister and most cabinet members took the position that any attempt to stretch the 
90-day period would mean a fundamental re-interpretation of the constitution.  Such 
an approach would further complicate an already difficult political situation.  In 
retrospect, the President feels that the result of the elections of February 3, 1997 has 
vindicated his position.  The people have carried out an ehtasab of their own; they 
have, to a remarkable and unanticipated extent, cleansed the political system of the 
people responsible for its corruption. 
I believe there is also a socio-economic argument for having confined the life 
of the Meraj Khalid caretaker administration to only 90 days.  Most of Pakistan’s 
economic and social problems—dealt with in Section A above—can be traced to a 
serious lack of political consensus on a number of fundamental issues.  What is the 
appropriate role for the government in Pakistan?  What proportion of the gross 
domestic product should be collected by the government as taxes?  What proportion 
of government revenues should Pakistan spend on defence?  What are the 
appropriate amounts of household, corporate, and public savings that Pakistan should 
aim to raise?  What kind of relations should Pakistan forge with international 
financial institutions?  How much devolution of authority should be permitted to the 
governments at the sub-national level?  The answers to these questions—if and when 
they are found—should be acceptable to most segments of society.  This can happen 
only if there is a serious and informed debate in the country.  By postponing 
elections and stretching the life of the caretaker administration beyond 90 days would 
have shifted the debate to an entirely different arena.  The Pakistani people, once 
again, would have been consumed by a discourse on the form of the political system 
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The two-track approach pursued by the caretaker administration in managing 
the economy was premised on the belief that stabilisation would have a very short-
term impact unless structural reforms were undertaken simultaneously. External 
reserves can be built over the short-term, but only at a high cost if structural change 
is not introduced at the same time. Fiscal deficits can be curtailed somewhat by 
reducing government expenditures and bringing about some improvements in the 
collection of taxes, but long-term stability can only be achieved if the role of the 
government is clearly defined and the tax base enlarged.  The last two are structural 
and not stabilisation measures. 
 
C.  EFFORTS TO STABILISE THE ECONOMY 
Let me now turn first to the stabilisation measures adopted by the caretaker 
administration soon after taking office. These measures fall into three categories:  
one, restoration of confidence; two, reviving relations with the International 
Monetary Fund; three, reducing government expenditures and improving tax 
collection.  I will deal with each one in turn. 
When I was summoned back to Pakistan by President Farooq Leghari and 
Prime Minister Meraj Khalid to become the leader of the new economic team, it was 
clear to me that I had to re-establish the confidence of the international community in 
Pakistan’s long-term economic prospects. This confidence had been eroded very 
seriously.  The first manifestation of this was the down-grading by Moodys, an 
influential rating agency, of the potential of investments in Pakistan.  I learnt of this 
action in London on November 8 during a brief stop-over en route to Islamabad from 
Washington.  The news came from some investment bankers I met in London who 
were interested in committing some of their resources to Pakistan but were concerned 
that such investments were now at considerable risk.  The Transparency International 
report of the summer of 1996, which ranked Pakistan as the second most corrupt 
country in the world after Nigeria, had not helped in creating a positive investment 
climate in the country.  Downgrading by Moodys had exacerbated the situation.  It 
was clear to me that, in the eyes of the international financial community, a number 
of question-marks hung over Pakistan.  Since I have been a believer for a long time 
in the inherent strength of the Pakistani economy, I thought it would be useful to 
focus on the positive rather than the negative aspect of the Pakistani economic 
situation.  There was no alternative available to us; we had to convince the world that 
Pakistan was not a failed economic state. 
On the flight from London to Islamabad, I wrote a plan of action that the 
caretaker administration must implement in order to restore not only the confidence 
of the international financial community in Pakistan’s economic future; such a plan 
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a rate of growth which would address the problem of poverty and bring about the 
long-postponed structural changes in the economy. 
Within a few hours of arriving in Islamabad, I met with President Farooq 
Leghari for several hours and discussed with him the need for a broad-based 
approach towards managing the economic crisis.  The President agreed with me that 
we had to handle both stabilisation and structural reform simultaneously.  At the 
same time, he emphasised that we must not neglect the real sectors of the economy.  
He was particularly concerned about the massive deterioration that had taken place in 
our irrigation system, Pakistan’s most precious economic resource.  He believed that, 
largely because of the collapse of the government structure and also because of 
increasing corruption, Pakistan was not deriving the benefit from an irrigation system 
that had been built over several decades.  The President was right.  As a result of a 
number of unfortunate developments—some bureaucratic, some political—we were 
running our irrigation system well below capacity.  Mismanagement of the elaborate 
system built over a century had reduced its carrying capacity to 75 to 80 percent of 
the amount of water it could deliver. 
The following day—on November 10—I gave a largely attended press 
conference at which I announced the caretaker administration’s intention to proceed 
simultaneously on stabilisation and structural change.  I covered a great deal of 
ground in this conference.  Some of what I said was to be the subject of a great deal 
of criticism by the press for most of the time I was in Pakistan. 
First, by announcing a detailed programme of reform, both stabilisation and 
structural, within 60 hours of having returned to Pakistan, I gave the impression that 
I had come with the recipe developed in Washington.  That I had been a student of 
the Pakistani economy for three decades; that I did not have to be influenced by the 
international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank in order to develop a programme of economic recovery and growth for 
my country; that Pakistan had to undertake serious economic, financial, and 
economic reforms to be counted as a responsible participant in the international 
financial and economic community were some of the arguments lost upon the 
participants in the conference.  Neither were these points reflected in the reporting on 
economic issues during the life of the caretaker administration. 
Second, I caused a run on the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan 
(IDBP) by suggesting that this was one of the institutions earmarked by the new 
government for either merger or liquidation.  I had assumed that my audience was 
familiar with the fact that under the legislation promulgated by the government of 
Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1974, all deposits in financial institutions, both 
commercial and investment, were fully secured by the government.  My statement 
did cause a run on IDBP. I realised later that the information available to the people 
operating in the market was not always at par with what the government had decreed.  
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In the eyes of some of my beholders, although not in my own eyes, my third 
mistake, for which I was to be pilloried for a long time, was to try and create the 
impression that Pakistan would be able to weather the storm created by the mis-
management of the government of Benazir Bhutto.  In my first press conference, I 
talked of the positive responses I expected from institutions such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and 
the Japanese Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF). I had held consultations 
with the first two before starting out from Washington and I had been led to believe 
that a significant amount of support would become available if we had appropriate 
stabilisation and structural reform programmes in place. The promised level of 
support did not materialise for two reasons. First, both institutions became concerned 
as to whether the policies being adopted by the caretaker administration would be 
pursued by the successor political government.  They had every reason to be 
cautious:  after all, none of the policies put in place by the government of Prime 
Minister Moeen Qureshi in 1993 was implemented by the administration of Prime 
Minister Benazir Bhutto.  Second, the Pakistani press played an extraordinary role in 
sowing the seeds of doubt about the real intentions of the caretaker administration 
and the long-term prospects of the Pakistani economy. 
By highlighting the extent of support that might become available from the 
IMF, the World Bank, the ADB, and the OECF, I was not being unrealistically 
optimistic.  My only motive was to signal to the international financial community 
the fact that Pakistan could gain access to some one billion dollars of additional 
capital inflows if we set our house in order and regained some of the confidence lost 
by our principal donors.  Unfortunately, only about $450 million of this amount 
became available to us while I was in office. 
All these doubts notwithstanding, we were able to stem the haemorrhage that 
had begun to take a heavy toll on our external accounts in the final days of the 
government of Benazir Bhutto.  Several hundred million dollars were lost in a period 
of six to eight weeks as nervous depositors began to draw down their holdings in 
external accounts.  Had that trend continued, Pakistan would not have been able to 
honour its obligations to foreign account holders that they could redeem their 
deposits at the time of their choosing.  The fact that the run on these deposits was 
reversed during the tenure of the caretaker administration could be counted as one of 
the major achievements of this period. 
After stemming the loss of confidence in our ability to service our debt, 
including the ability to service foreign exchange deposits, we had to deal with the 
serious problem that had been created by the deterioration of our relationship with 
the International Monetary Fund.  A great deal of journalistic ink was used in 
condemning the Fund and what its critics perceive to be its approach towards 
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question I was often asked.  The Fund—and its sister organisation the World Bank—
are terribly misunderstood in Pakistan and in many other developing countries as 
well. 
The IMF’s policies in Pakistan have been subject to a great deal of criticism, 
particularly on the part of the press.  What has the Fund asked Pakistan to do:  to 
reduce fiscal deficit and, as a corollary, to bring current accounts deficits under 
control; to reduce the resort to bank financing (printing of money) in order to finance 
budgetary deficits; to adopt a trading regime that would make Pakistan more 
competitive in the rapidly evolving global trading system; to develop financial 
institutions (banks, investment companies, insurance companies) that would help the 
real sectors of the economy.  It is impossible to quarrel with any of these 
prescriptions, especially when their adoption is accompanied by a flow of resources 
that help the balance of payments situation.  In addition, without the IMF’s “good 
house-keeping seal of approval”, Pakistan would find it difficult to access the 
world’s capital markets.  No investment or commercial bank would be prepared to 
lend to Pakistan if the Fund is not actively involved in advising the country.  We 
would invite an enormous amount of difficulty for ourselves by walking out of an 
arrangement with the IMF.  In the discussions I held with am very pleased that Prime 
Minister-elect Nawaz Sharif and Sartaj Aziz, his principal economic advisor, I 
emphasised the importance of a good working relationship with the IMF.  They 
accepted my arguments:  arriving at an arrangement with the Fund was to become an 
important plank in the programme of economic reform launched by the Sharif 
government after it took office in February, 1997. 
The last part of the caretaker’s stabilisation effort was to reduce government 
expenditures.  Over the years—in particular from 1993-1996—governments in 
Pakistan have used the state to provide employment for their political followers and 
for the development programme to accommodate schemes and projects of dubious 
economic value to the economy and society. To bring the run-away government 
expenditures under control, the caretaker administration cut both current and 
development expenditures.  The axe fell more heavily on the development budget; 
the allocation for the annual development programme for 1996-97 was reduced by 19 
percent, from Rs 105 billion to Rs 85 billion.  With this reduction, Pakistan scored 
another low in its economic history in terms of the proportion of gross domestic 
product committed to development.  With development claiming only 3.4 percent of 
GDP—two percentage points less than the expenditure on defence—the government 
in Pakistan is not providing basic services to its population.  However, given the 
serious shortfall in resources, we had no choice but to cut down development 
expenditures. 
In addition to reducing government expenditure, we also made a serious effort 
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the Central Board of Revenue (CBR); to monitor, on a weekly basis, the performance 
of the CBR; to terminate the contract of foreign companies that were hired by the 
Bhutto government to value imports; and to close a number of loopholes that were 
used by tax payers to avoid meeting their obligation to the state.  These efforts 
provided good results:  tax collection in December, 1996 exceeded our targets by a 
significant amount.  These efforts persuaded the IMF to release a tranche of $80 
million from the Stand-by Arrangement amount promised to Pakistan in October, 
1996. 
No sooner had the caretaker administration left office than the new 
government had to announce a series of additional measures to stabilise the economy.  
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif appealed to all citizens of Pakistan, whether they were 
living and working in the country or abroad, to help the new government by putting 
their savings in especially designed funds.  The Prime Minister also announced 
another set of measures to cut down on government expenditures.  His first address to 
the nation after assuming office sent an unambiguous signal that Pakistan continued 
to face a serious economic situation.  If that were the case, had the caretakers failed 
in their mission? 
The answer to this question is most definitely no.  There are two reasons why I 
would suggest that we succeeded in our objective to stabilise the economy.  First, we 
should compare the health of the economy on February 17, not to what should have 
been the case, but to what the situation was on November 5, 1996.  We stemmed the 
decline in reserves; we paid all our bills while bringing about a modest improvement 
in our reserves. We stopped the erosion of the financial viability of public sector 
commercial banks. We stopped useless government expenditures.  We set the stage 
for achieving fiscal stability. In short, we pulled the economy from a nose dive.  
However, when we left, the economy had not gained much altitude; it was still 
cruising close to the ground. 
Second, in order to address Pakistan’s short-term problems—the problems that 
surface every two to three years and cause a serious crisis—we must bring about a 
deep structural change in our economy.  The beginning of such a change was made 
during the tenure of the caretaker administration headed by Prime Minister Meraj 
Khalid.  That is the subject of Section D of this article. 
 
D.  BEGINNINGS OF STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION 
Three months is too short a period for addressing the problems created by 
long-postponed structural reforms. The faultlines that had appeared under the 
structure of the economy could not be adequately repaired, let alone removed in the 
time available to the caretaker administration.  And yet, I was convinced that we had 
to begin the process of structural change.  Structural reforms had to accompany 
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shortly after arriving in Islamabad, I did not have any difficulty in having him accept 
this position. We agreed that I would work on a programme of comprehensive 
economic reforms to be announced by the President after the caretaker administration 
had completed half of its mandated tenure.  We settled on December 25, 1996—the 
Quaid-e-Azam’s birthday—as an appropriate day for the announcement of the 
reform. 
My first task was to quickly assemble a group of people who could work with 
me to undertake this massive task.  The economic team I assembled included Hafiz 
Pasha, Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission; Salman Shah, Chairman of 
the Privatisation Commission; Moeen Afzal, Secretary, Finance; and Javed Burki, 
Secretary, Economic Affairs.  We met every morning at eight in my room in the 
Secretariat.  Sometimes Zubair Khan, Commerce Minister, and Muhammad Yaqub, 
Governor of the State Bank, also attended these meetings. 
Our starting-point was the document I had produced while I was flying from 
Washington to Islamabad.  My document, in turn, had built upon the Faultlines 
articles Dawn had published in August, 1996. 
We decided to cluster our programme of structural reform in four broad areas.  
By far the most important was the reform of the fiscal system. 
 
(i)  Fiscal System 
The problems with the fiscal system had been diagnosed for a long time:  they 
included a very narrow base of the system, inelasticity of government revenues and 
the enormous leakages that occurred from all levels within the system. The leakages 
could only be addressed by putting in a system of accountability.  That was being 
done by some other members of the caretaker administration.  Their efforts resulted 
in the promulgation of the Ehatasab (Accountability) Ordinance by the President. 
Our effort at expanding the tax base was concentrated at extending income tax 
to agriculture. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had exempted agriculture from federally mandated 
taxes. This provision had been incorporated in the constitution of 1973 and had 
resulted in many distortions in the fiscal system.  Other than sheltering the powerful 
landed interests from income tax, it had also opened a vast loophole, used with 
impunity by many wealthy families.  Although it was clear that agricultural incomes 
could not be exempt from tax, the constitution presented a major obstacle in the way 
of needed fiscal rationalisation. The only way out was to persuade provincial 
administrations to levy a tax on agriculture—something allowed by the constitution.  
This is what we proceeded to do. 
There was intense debate even within the ranks of the caretaker administration 
about the desirability of bringing agricultural incomes within the fiscal system.  The 
matter was ultimately resolved in a meeting chaired by President Leghari and 
attended by the Chief Ministers and Finance Ministers from the four provinces.   
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don’t accept that agriculturists don’t pay taxes”, he told me in the cabinet meeting.  
“After all, we are charged for water and we pay land tax”.  I reminded the Chief 
Minister that water charge was not a tax but a very small payment for a vital input for 
agriculture.  Textile mill owners buy cotton for their factories.  We made a modest 
entry into this difficult area.  The tax introduced by the caretaker administration in 
the forms of a land productivity tax, if fully collected, would amount to only 2 
percent of agricultural incomes or 0.5 percent of gross domestic product. 
The other important fiscal measure adopted by the administration was also in 
the nature of rationalisation.  By the time we took office, general sales tax (GSA)—a 
form of value-added tax (VAT)—had become a major source of government revenue.  
An ideal VAT does not permit exemptions (the Pakistan GSA was not levied on a 
number of items) and is charged at the same rate (the Pakistani GSA had a number of 
rates).  However, the principal system would not have permitted the complete 
rationalisation of the GSA.  That notwithstanding, we brought some, previously 
exempted items, under the tax’s purview. 
We also sought to rationalise public utility charges and petroleum and 
petroleum product prices.  The purpose was not only to raise additional government 
revenues.  It was also our intention to introduce optimum pricing for the products 
produced and services provided by the public sector.  Given the share of the public 
sector in the gross domestic product, whimsical (or politically inspired) pricing 
introduces serious distortions.  The pricing regime in the public sector also imposed a 
heavy burden on such corporations as WAPDA, PSO, Sui Northern and Sui Southern 
Corporations, and PIA. 
These adjustments in taxes and prices were expected to contribute to a 
reduction, over time, in the budgetary deficit.  In the agreement we negotiated with 
the International Monetary Fund, we fixed the budgetary deficit target at 4 percent of 
gross domestic product—the same target included in the programme negotiated with 
the IMF by the administration of Ms Benazir Bhutto in December 1995.  There was 
some pressure on me to opt for a higher deficit target and I believe that the IMF may 
have accepted a target of 5 percent deficit.  However, it was my firm belief that 
Pakistan had to make a serious effort at fiscal adjustment and that it was appropriate 
to opt for an ambitious programme of deficit reduction.  In any event, the 
administration of Mian Nawaz Sharif, decided that a relentless pursuit of deficit 
reduction aimed to yield a budgetary deficit of 4 percent of GDP, would have sent 
the economy into a deep recession.  The Fund argued with that position. 
 
(ii)  Revival and Rebuilding of the Financial  
and Capital Systems 
There was only one way to revive the financial system, damaged by years of 
perverse interference by the politicians and the bureaucracy.  The only way to deal 
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to the private sector.  However, the privatisation of banks, unless accompanied by the 
establishment of a robust supervisory and regulatory system, could create monopolies 
that would create an entirely new set of problems.  There were many examples from 
other countries that suggested that the transfer of banks from the public to the private 
sector was a process that demanded a great deal of preparation and exercise of care in 
carrying it through.  Mexico had privatised public sector banks in a great hurry in the 
early 1990s.  Most of them were purchased by industrial groups who paid three to 
four times the book value of the banks they acquired.  Having paid a higher price for 
their acquisition, the “grupos” wanted to rapidly turn a profit.  They went on a 
lending spree with little care given to ascertaining the quality of the assets they were 
accumulating. When Mexico was hit by the “peso crisis” in December 1994 interest 
rates went through the roof and property prices crashed through the floor.  The 
Mexican banks discovered that they could  not get their customers to service their 
loans.  For many bank borrowers, the yearly payments they had to make to their 
lenders were much greater than the value of the assets they had pledged.  The 
borrowers launched a movement under the banner of  “El Barzon” (meaning yoke) to 
obtain relief from the government and to stop the banks from foreclosing on the 
properties pledged as collateral by the borrowers.  Even without the movement, the 
Mexican legal system was not strong enough to help the banks in their efforts to 
secure payments from their borrowers. 
There was a widespread fear that the difficulties being experienced by 
individual banks could produce a systemic financial crisis.  The government had only 
one recourse available to it:  it intervened and effectively renationalised a number of 
banks it had privatised not too long before.  More than two years after the first signs 
of crisis appeared in Mexico, the banking sector continues to drain government 
resources.  The accumulated cost to the exchequer for handling the crisis is estimated 
at 12 to 15 percent of the country’s GDP. 
I had personal experience of dealing with the banking crisis in Mexico.  Under 
my supervision the World Bank helped the Mexican Government develop a plan of 
rescue.  The Bank provided the Mexicans a loan of $1 billion in the Spring of 1995, 
the largest operation it had ever mounted in its history. 
In many ways, Pakistan’s financial system—or, more accurately the part that 
was under the control of the public sector—was even more fragile than that of 
Mexico in December 1994.  That notwithstanding, the caretaker administration 
decided to proceed with great caution.  There were three elements in our programme 
to restructure the banking sector.  First, we equipped the Privatisation Commission to 
exercise “due diligence” in preparing the banks for sale to the private sector.  Second, 
we strengthened the bank regulatory capacity in the State Bank of Pakistan, the 
country’s central bank.  Third, we decided to set up a public sector entity—we called 
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from the books of the banks to be sold.  The RTC’s raison d’etre was to deal with 
that part of the banking sector assets that the press in Pakistan had come to label as 
“stuck-up loans”.  The decision to set up the RTC was the most novel part of our 
operation and the one that was the most difficult to explain even to the officials of the 
State Bank. 
The State Bank wanted the banks to be privatised without their bad assets 
being separated from those that were still performing.  On the basis of some earlier 
privatisation—in particular those of the Muslim Commercial Bank and the Bankers 
Equity Limited—the officials of the State Bank argued that it was better to leave the 
task of collecting bad debts to the new owners. 
Drawing upon Pakistan’s own experience—and also on that of other countries 
that had dealt with banking crises—I was convinced that an RTC type of structure 
would save the government a great deal of money.  It would also encourage foreign 
banks to increase their presence in the country.  After all, the attempt made by the 
government of Ms  Benazir Bhutto to sell United Bank Limited (UBL) had resulted 
in a near fiasco.  The UBL was loaded with bad loans at the time it was offered for 
sale:  the sale offer produced a poor response.  There was only one relatively serious 
offer and that too came with so many strings attached that it made little sense either 
for the Bhutto administration or for the caretaker government to go forward with the 
sale. 
Placing the privatisation of the public sector banks on the fast track and 
establishing the Resolution Trust Corporation to deal with the bad debts acquired by 
the public sector after years of corruption and mismanagement were the only 
significant structural reforms introduced by the caretaker government that were not 
fully implemented by the Nawaz Sharif administration.  Most other reforms 
introduced by us were included in the economic measures adopted by the Sharif 
government. 
I also sought to introduce privately managed pension funds in Pakistan as a 
part of our efforts to develop capital markets.  An underdeveloped, poorly regulated, 
and poorly managed capital market was one of the contributing factors for the very 
low household savings rate in Pakistan.  Once again, I borrowed from my experience 
in Latin America to bring reform ideas to Pakistan.  Chile had seen a remarkable 
impact on its savings performance after it introduced private pension funds.  Other 
Latin American countries had studied the Chilean experience and had concluded that 
what had worked for their neighbour should also work for them.  Argentina, Bolivia, 
Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay allowed the private sector to set up pension 
funds and began to register a change in the saving behaviour of their citizens as well. 
Pakistan does not have a contractual savings industry—a category of 
institutions that includes pension funds. There are only two forms of “savings” 
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resources to commit to real estate, they opt for large families in order to secure some 
old age security for themselves.  The rich can—and do—invest in real estate.  There 
is little that can be obtained in the form of social good by investment in savings and 
real estate.  It is important to bring about a change in saving behaviour and pension 
funds, that allows the people to set aside a small amount of money every month or 
every quarter.  This can make a significant contribution to reducing the size of poor 
families and to also providing potential investors with a reliable source for long-term 
capital. 
The caretaker administration set up a task force under the chairmanship of 
Naseem Mirza, a highly respected business executive, to prepare a plan for the 
establishment of contractual savings institutions in the country.  The plan offered by 
the task force dealt at great length with the reform of the workers’ benevolent fund 
managed by the government.  It did not take up the issue of creating contractual 
savings institutions.  Since we were occupied with a number of other concerns, this 
aspect of structural change remained unaddressed. 
We also introduced a number of reforms aimed at removing the distortions in the 
tax regions that applied to the capital markets.  The markets had done poorly ever since 
Ms Bhutto ran into problems with the IMF.  The buoyancy in the markets during the 
first two years of her administration was on account of the flow of foreign capital into 
the Karachi exchange.  The problem with the Fund not only stopped new money 
coming into the country, nervous investors, uneasy about Pakistan’s economic 
prospects, withdrew their investment.  The result was a virtual collapse of the market. 
It was our expectation that the reforms introduced by us would revive 
investors’ confidence. The reforms were well received but the markets did not 
respond. The continuous political uncertainty was too large a factor in the 
calculations of the investor community for our reforms to produce a significant 
positive effect. 
  
(iii)  Autonomy for the Central Bank 
By the time the caretaker administration led by Prime Minister Meraj Khalid 
took office, Pakistan had been pursuing with impunity almost total political control over 
the State Bank, the country’s central bank.  The Ministry of Finance could order the 
State Bank to cover its deficits.  This control over the central bank did not do great 
damage if the Ministry of Finance was managed well; which was the case during the 
Ayub Khan and Zia-ul-Haq periods.  However, during the first Nawaz Sharif 
administration and the last two years of the government of Benazir Bhutto, the Ministry 
of Finance openly interfered in the conduct of monetary policy by the State Bank.  The 
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The first real attempt to establish an autonomous central bank was made 
during the time of another caretaker administration, the one headed by Moeen 
Qureshi. That attempt came in the form of a presidential ordinance issued in 
September 1993. However, Benazir Bhutto’s government, which took office 
following the PPP victory in the elections held in October, allowed the ordinance to 
lapse. Our administration not only revived the ordinance, we put more teeth into it.  
According to the provisions incorporated in the presidential ordinance of January 
1997, the State Bank was to conduct monetary policy without any interference from 
Islamabad.  The Governor of the State Bank was required to manage monetary policy 
keeping in view the growth and inflation targets established by a five-member board 
of which he was a member.  If the government could not cover its expenditure from 
its revenue receipts, the government was not obliged to come to the assistance of 
Islamabad by expanding money supply. 
 
(iv) Human Development, Poverty Alleviation, 
and Improving Income Distribution 
The fourth area in which the caretaker administration sought to bring about 
some structural improvement was that of human development, poverty alleviation 
and income distribution.  We recognised at the very outset that the time available to 
us was too short to make a palpable difference in any of these related issues.  We 
could, however, set in place policies that could make contributions over the medium 
term.  If some of the policies we adopted are followed—and, also, built upon by the 
government that took office in February 1997—significant improvements could 
occur in improving the welfare of the common citizens of Pakistan. 
In the area of human development, we addressed the problems posed by the 
rapid polarisation of the education sector.  While the private sector is providing 
adequate education at all levels to the children of those who can afford to pay, the 
poor have been badly neglected.  The failure of the public sector to deliver 
reasonable education to the poor is hurting them enormously.  Increasingly, the poor 
are turning to religious schools—the madrasas—for education.  The present structure 
of the education sector, therefore, has the making of a social tragedy that could 
engulf Pakistan quickly—as quickly as the embrace of the Talibaan, educated in 
madrasas, over Afghanistan. 
We sought to restore some balance to this rapidly polarising situation by 
empowering the education authorities in Islamabad and in the provinces to tax the 
well-to-do who were sending their children to private schools.  Such a tax could be 
levied on the tuition paid to the privately managed schools, colleges, and universities 
and the receipts from it could be placed in a scholarship fund to provide access to 
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At the same time, we took steps to encourage the further expansion of the 
private sector’s presence in education.  We removed most constraints on the 
establishment of private institutions.  Accreditation authorities were established in 
the federal capital and in the provinces to grade private sector institutions.  Some 
assessment of the performance of these institutions was needed to help households 
make appropriate choices. 
Our poverty-alleviating efforts recognised that the state in Pakistan did not have 
the institutional strength to target subsidies to the poor.  The private sector, on the other 
hand, had developed considerable capacity to do this.  Accordingly, we created a 
Poverty Fund to be managed by a consortium of non-governmental organisations. The 
Fund was to receive contributions from the government and would also be eligible for 
receiving the support of the international donor community.  The Fund managers were 
to apply simple tests to determine beneficiary eligibility. 
Finally, we recognised that bringing about significant improvements in 
income distribution requires time and political will.  There was little we could do in 
this respect.  It was our expectation that by levying a tax on agricultural incomes we 
could create conditions which, over time, would bring about some redistribution of 
land through the market. 
That the Government of Mian Nawaz Sharif, which came into office with a 
majority unprecedented in Pakistan’s history, continued with most of the structural 
reforms introduced by the caretaker administration shows that there is now consensus 
in the country on most economic issues.  That is fortunate since, as we discuss below, 
Pakistan does not have the luxury of time. 
 
E.  THE FUTURE 
There has been a perceptible slow-down in Pakistan’s growth rate over the 
past seven years.  Since 1990, the gross domestic product has increased at an annual 
rate of 4.2 percent, compared with 5.7 percent over the 1950-90 period. To what 
should we attribute this one-and-a-half percentage point decline in growth? 
This is an important question to which there is a simple answer. For the 
various reasons discussed in the first section of this article, the faultlines that lie 
under the structure of the economy have begun to take their toll. It was once 
believed—and I shared that belief—that Pakistan’s structural growth rate was of the 
order of 5 to 6 percent a year.  This meant that if the country was not subjected to 
extraordinary exogenous shocks, it could continue to grow at 5 to 6 percent year after 
year. The fact that the rate of GDP increase in the forty-year period following 
independence fell in this range supported this view. On many occasions I 
extrapolated this rate of increase in GDP and argued that Pakistan was on the 
threshold of becoming a middle-income country.  That view reflected not only 
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not fully comprehended the extent of the structural problems—or faultlines—
Pakistan had to deal with in order to graduate from the ranks of poor nations and 
become a middle-income country. 
Pakistan’s structural problems did not slow down the rate of GDP growth for 
two reasons.  For four decades, the country’s inability to generate enough resources 
to have a rate of investment that could support a growth rate of 5-6 percent was 
compensated by the availability of foreign savings. There were two important 
sources of finance to which Pakistan had access:  concessional funds from both 
bilateral and unilateral donors that were provided to Pakistan in large part because of 
its geopolitical situation and the flow of remittances sent by Pakistanis working 
abroad to their families.  The availability of external savings helped the country to 
sustain high levels of current account and budgetary deficits over a long period.  The 
sharp reduction in external capital flows in recent years leaves Pakistan with two 
options:  either to go on living with large imbalances or to induce a reduction in the 
rates of investment and the government’s current expenditures.  Pakistan would court 
disaster with either of these options.  A current account deficit of more than a couple 
of percent of GDP is not sustainable—even a deficit of 2 percent can be financed if 
the country is able to provide a sizeable increase in imports.  The option of large-
scale commercial borrowing to which Pakistan has increasingly resorted in recent 
years not only postpones the problem, it seriously compounds it.  As discussed in 
Section A of this paper, the burden of external debt has already reached 
uncomfortable levels.  It should not be allowed to increase. 
Living with a rate of GDP growth of 4 percent a year means an increase in per 
capita income of just over 1 percent a year.  This is too small an increase for the 
purpose of dealing with the situation of poverty.  In fact, a GDP growth rate of only 4 
percent a year will exacerbate the level of poverty. 
The only feasible option is to continue with the structural transformation of 
the country on the lines undertaken by the caretaker administration. Comments 
 
I apologise to the audience for my third successive appearance on the podium 
in this meeting. I would have been flattered if I had achieved a similar hat-trick in the 
cricket field, but unfortunately not all of us, including perhaps Mr Burki, are as 
versatile as his illustrious cousin, Mr Imran Khan. 
Since the late 1970s Pakistan has undergone a series of structural adjustments 
and reforms, largely carried out with the assistance of international financial 
institutions, especially the IMF and the World Bank. Even a cursory survey of 
Pakistani structural reforms, which is omitted for reasons of time is that they have 
been undertaken too fast and too soon, rather than too little and too late and without 
any serious attempt to analyse and foresee their consequences before their adoption. 
For instance, during the last five years Pakistan economic reforms have opened the 
country’s stock markets to foreigners. Unlike in some neighbouring countries and 
even some ASEAN countries, access to Pakistan’s stock markets is easy and 
international investors have complete freedom to buy and sell any share without limit 
on investment and can fully repatriate their capital and profits. However, while 
Pakistan benefited from the 1993 boom in worldwide emerging markets, it also 
suffered from the sell off in developing markets after the upward trend in interest 
rates in the United States in February 1994. Again in December 1994, the Mexican 
financial crisis figured a second wave of emerging market selling which have 
plunged the country’s three stock exchanges into a long recession. 
The government’s efforts to privatise state-owned banks and industries have 
had mixed results. Only two of the five major nationalised banks have yet been 
privatised. Foreign investors’ enthusiastic response to the government’s offer to 
invest directly in the power sector, which is scheduled to be privatised of which will 
begin this year, resulted in MOUs worth over US$ 20 billion, although they never 
got reflected in the official records of flows of direct or portfolio investments. 
Nevertheless, the Government became a victim of self-delusion and went on a 
spending spree disregarding the covenants signed with the IMF and World Bank. 
Indeed, one of the then close advisers of the former Prime Minister and her husband, 
the renowned financial expert, Mr Salman Taseer, argued strongly that the new 
window of private portfolio and direct investments obviated the need for borrowings 
from IMF and the World Bank, which imposed strict and unrealistic conditionalities. 
Even if the wildest dreams of Mr Shahid Hasan Khan and Mr Salman Farooqi had 
come true it is difficult to see how Pakistani stock markets, with a market 
capitalisation of only about $ 10 billion, would have been able to absorb such 
massive infusions of foreign capital in a short period of time without the Pakistani 




Mr Burki’s task as the saviour of the economy from a possibly imminent fiscal 
and financial collapse is indeed unenviable an inevitable necessity and should no 
doubt receive precedence over other economic issues. One can only wish him 
Godspeed. However, it would be a grave error on the part of the economic team he is 
heading if the attention is restricted to crisis management issues alone and gives 
insufficient attention to the deeper malaise that the economy and society suffer from. 
Nor should corruption, loan defaults and accountability be the sole 
watchwords of the current reforms. By succumbing to the rhetoric that legitimises the 
present regime, like Islamisation legitimised Ziaul Haq, the present regime can lead 
the country into the quagmire of vindictive politics without achieving any substantial 
improvement in the economy. Consider the contrafactual scenario in which the 
mindboggling billions attributed to corruption and loan defaults—or at least a 
significant part of them—were somehow reinvested by the beneficiaries into 
productive activities and the wild dreams about massive foreign capital inflows had 
in part been realised. The country would have been jogging along the road to 
tigerhood and middle income group status and all would have been forgiven and 
forgotten and perhaps even glorified both by the media, if not the people at large, and 
the international agencies. 
There is, of course, the need to maximise efforts to recover long-standing 
loans and curb corruption within the present institutional parameters, it is obvious 
also that real progress, however slow, can only be made if our institutional structure 
is strengthened. Some shock therapy is certainly in order, but Mr Burki, who was 
incharge of the China desk in the World Bank before assuming his responsibilities 
for Latin America, must be well aware of the virtues of gradualism in the reform 
process. 
Attention needs to be turned from defaults to the faults in the economy on 
which Mr Burki wrote impassionately in the Pakistani press a few months back. One 
may not agree with Mr Burki’s list of a dozen faultlines in the economy, but it is 
clear that the imbalances in the economy that have accumulated over the years 
through mismanagement and neglect need to be cognised through detailed research 
and analysis and their solutions arrived at and debated in a transparent and 
unrestrained manner. 
Being an experienced traveller both across space and time, Mr Burki prefers to 
travel with a light intellectual baggage, jettisoning that which may become a liability. 
The package of reforms being pursued under his stewardship as a prelude to the 
conclusion of the proposed new FSAF loan for $ 2.5 billion with IMF seems to have 
a teo-point agenda, viz. the reduction of the fiscal deficit to 4 percent of GDP and the 
augmenting of the foreign exchange reserves to the level of another mystical figure 
of $ 1 billion. There is no point in agreeing to a set of conditionalities which are 




transparent discussion of their feasibility and consequences, as has been done in the 
past. 
The current economic crisis in Pakistan clearly has its linkage with the 
political crisis. Although both parties have fully endorsed the liberalisation policies 
and economic reforms carried out in the past five years—in fact these were initiated 
during the previous regime when the political party currently in opposition was in 
power—the continuing struggle for power has considerably eroded the environment 
of political stability which is crucially needed for implementing these reforms and for 
them to bear fruits. The current political and constitutional impasse has further 
aggravated the situation. Without a firm consensus not only on the current economic 
reform agenda, both in the social and economic sector, but also on implementing it in 
an impersonal and non-partisan manner, the current political uncertainty will 
continue to erode business confidence, especially of the foreign investors. Pakistan’s 
current impasse emphasises the need for stronger institutional base and broader 
national reconciliation, rather than fragmenting its body politic, to take full 
advantage of the opportunities that the changes in the global economy and its unique 
geographical position have made it possible. 
The acid test of the stabilisation package being proposed by Mr Burki will be 
the equitable burden it will impose on different groups, with the poor receiving a 
negative burden. Pakistan’s business community is hardly a paragon of virtue and 
business ethics, having been nurtured in the past by official patronage of its many 
rent-seeking activities and needs to be weaned away from its parasitic culture of 
fiscal and financial frauds and induced into undertaking productive activities as much 
as the bureaucrats and other elites need to be weaned away from the VIP culture. But 
the foremost gauge on which the stabilisation and structural reforms will be judged is 
the extent to which resources can be mobilised from the affluent farmers. If the 
package succeeds in mobilising 20 billion rupees as agricultural income tax, it will be 
seen as an incontrovertible success, given the current feudal hold on the power 
structure. If half of that sum is devoted to education and other social services, Mr 
Burki’s package will earn a place in history. Despite my great professional 
sympathies with Mr Burki and his team, I do not think that they will even remotely 
be able to approach these goals. 
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